


The German Tribune

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

Hamburg, 24 July 1977
Sixteenth Year - No. 797 - By air

C 20725 C

Schmidt's visit to Carter clears the air

Small wonder President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt got on like a house on fire. Both are forceful and imaginative personalities. Neither are men to dodge issues.

Plain speaking did their Washington talks a world of good, and the talks were evidently geared to suit the two leaders.

Cyrus Vance and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Secretary of State and Foreign Minister respectively, were cast in strictly supporting roles and those were the roles they played.

Jimmy Carter and Helmut Schmidt were the men who said what was to be said and decided what was to be decided.

The self-confidence with which the new US President has taken over at the helm of the Western world is staggering. The White House has been reassigned its role as the control panel of the West's policy decisions.

The Kremlin pales in comparison and is rendered increasingly insecure by the combination of power and morality that Mr Carter embodies.

The unusual make-up of the new President does, however, render more difficult a detailed assessment of the immediate future of detente. But it does reduce the grey, intermediate zone that was part and parcel of Dr Kissinger's balancing-act.

Since Mr Carter leaves no doubt that as far as he and the US administration are concerned there will be no vacillating on, say, human rights the limits to compromise are also clearly apparent.

In President Carter's eyes human rights are not just a throw of the dice. They are an inalienable paradigm of his conduct of world affairs even where the East bloc is concerned, not a tactical consideration but a constant.

That was why the President and the Chancellor could hardly differ on human rights. A politician in this country who retains responsibility for dozens of refugee and repatriation camps cannot but welcome, in principle at least, the President's unswerving stand on human rights.

Were Helmut Schmidt to have disagreed with Mr Carter on this matter of conscience, the visit would have been an utter fiasco and testified to an alarming failure to understand the President's psyche.

Having reached agreement — as a matter of course, let it be added — on fundamentals, President Carter was in a position to show a modicum of understanding for the Bonn government's preference for prising loose at least a few handfuls of people from totalitarian tutelage.

Since the President is so inexorable in his human rights views he could hardly be expected expressly to approve of Bonn's procedural approach, and the Chancellor made no attempt to persuade him to do so.

Herr Schmidt evidently encountered a similar measure of understanding on other critical issues. The US government no longer objects to Bonn's economic stability target in the way it used regularly to do.

The Chancellor obviously managed to put across the message that export business is being rendered difficult enough as it is by the continual revaluation of the deutschmark.

US opinion is no longer as upset as it was about Bonn's nuclear deal with Brazil either. Washington no longer resents this country's resolute stand on the issue, endorsed as it has been by Bavaria's Franz Josef Strauss. All concerned will be gratified that, by and large, the air has been cleared.

But neither Mr Carter nor Herr Schmidt would care to hazard a guess on the development of East-West ties, which are in heavy weather at any number of points.

US President Jimmy Carter welcoming Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the White House. Mrs Hannelore Schmidt and Mrs Rosalynn Carter are seen in the background. (Photo: dpa)

Mr Brezhnev is not keen on meeting President Carter at present. The destruction lobbies on both sides are getting up a head of steam. Mr Carter takes a dimmer view of Soviet imperialism than his predecessors, he makes more provocative use of the vocabulary of detente and he does not feel that reality is unchangeable.

He seems intent on prising Communist Cuba loose from Moscow's bear-hug and refuses to rate Cuban soldiers, engineers and propagandists in Africa as mere stooges of the Kremlin, so Mr Carter is evidently capable of taking an unorthodox view. As far as Jimmy Carter is concerned, issues have not yet already been decided everywhere.

He clearly still lacks experience in dealing with Moscow, and Mr Carter's close advisers include not a single man who has ever negotiated directly with the Russians and been able to study their obduracy in the flesh, as it were.

Helmut Schmidt is one of the few leaders who are now personally acquainted with both Mr Brezhnev and Mr Carter, but he is not cut out for the role of intermediary. Men of their calibre do not deal with brokers in any case.

But Herr Schmidt may well convey to Mr Brezhnev in Bonn this autumn the impression he has gained of Mr Carter. The Soviet leader is keen to hear what anyone has to say about his current opposite number. President Carter is assuming increasing importance — even in the Kremlin's eyes.

Robert Schmelzer

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 16 July 1977)

IN THIS ISSUE

Detente has drifted into the doldrums

Silence has descended on detente. The enthusiasm of the early seventies has long since vanished, and even the framework within which East-West ties were to be kept within the bounds of possibility has grown more restrictive.

Deadlock has arisen and many observers reckon detente has reached a dead end. Rhetorical claims that there is no substitute for detente cannot conceal the fact that a new era has dawned; nor, for that matter, can attempts to bring about a turning point by means of state visits. It is not just the tenor of East-West ties that has changed; the assumptions on which they are based have likewise undergone sweeping changes.

The new foreign policy line adopted by the Carter administration has been the principal instrument of change. President Carter's priorities differ from those of previous US administrations. Moral criteria have come to the fore.

Mr Carter, for instance, has chosen to make human rights a cornerstone of US foreign policy, and human rights are just about the most sensitive issue there is as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Differences of viewpoint on this issue are insuperable.

In comparison another dispute which has arisen at the Salt talks pales in significance, although it too could have substantial repercussions.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in continuing with the Salt talks, but they have nothing in common on human rights, and compromise appears out of the question, with Mr Carter increasingly seeming not to be motivated by tactical considerations.

The Carter administration's foreign policy is in keeping with the President's character and convictions, and his growing domestic popularity indicates that his fellow-Americans are equally keen to take a moral stand in the aftermath of the Vietnam and Watergate debacles.

Moscow will doubtless have registered this trend and drawn the appropriate conclusions, which currently seem to be that the "defamatory imperialist human rights campaign" is the main item on the foreign policy agenda.

Civil rights activists in the Soviet Union are being arrested by the score for their advocacy of the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement, and the first open attack has been launched on the Spanish Communists, who have accused the Soviet Union of being backward on humanitarian issues.

First and foremost, however, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have deteriorated. Mr Brezhnev has announced that he has no desire to meet the new President for the time being. Ties between the superpowers have reached a new low and the climate of world affairs has taken a corresponding turn for the worse.

This country is among the first to notice the repercussions. Its vital interests include West Berlin, relations with the GDR and exit permits for ethnic Germans from the East bloc, and Bonn cannot ignore the effect of the cooling-off of international relations on what, for it, are by no means peripheral issues.

Other Nato countries in Europe are similarly interested, for a variety of rea-

Continued on page 2

■ FOREIGN AFFAIRS

'Green Paper' assesses prospects of the Spirit of Helsinki

The Spirit of Helsinki is a much-vaunted apparition, having frequently been conjured up by both sides in anticipation of the Belgrade follow-up conference convened to assess the repercussions of the Helsinki Agreement on security and cooperation in Europe.

Each side has busily accused the other of breaching the spirit of Helsinki, so much so that the letter of the Helsinki accords at times seems to have been forgotten.

The Spirit of Helsinki certainly seems capable of withstanding a fair amount of punishment.

While the West claims that disciplinary measures imposed on East bloc dissidents run counter to it, the East bloc is no less insistent that its moves fully accord with the selfsame spirit.

Lothar Loewe, the Federal Republic of Germany's TV's correspondent in East Berlin, was expelled by the GDR on the grounds that he was in breach of the Helsinki accords, while Bonn argued that his expulsion constituted a breach of the Spirit of Helsinki.

Are critics right in claiming that the Helsinki Agreement is no more than a "joint platform for ideological warfare"?

The way in which the Helsinki accords have so far been implemented certainly gives rise to more queries than it answers. There is an urgent need of criteria and yardsticks, a number of which are advanced in a compendium published by the German Peace and Conflict Research Association (DGFK) just in time for the Belgrade follow-up conference.

Official publications and other documents and reports that lay claim to comprehensive, fundamental coverage of an issue are frequently dubbed a Black Paper, or a Red Paper or a White Paper.

White Papers are usually official, whereas other colours denote the advocacy of a particular shade of political opinion. Why the editors of this particular compendium have opted for the designation Green Paper is by no means clear, the only obvious inference being that green, in German, is the colour not of envy, but of hope.

Coverage of the repercussions of Helsinki is not, however, limited to views that tally with any particular line of argument. The authors of two dozen articles deal with their particular aspect of the subject with academic thoroughness, assessing it from a variety of approached systematically, Basket by Basket.

The various authors are at least agreed on one point that ought, perhaps, to have been a matter of course, but was, in fact, set aside by many commentators in a flight of euphoria.

The Final Act, as the Helsinki accords were officially designated, was signed on the express understanding that it in no way brought to an end the irreconcilable confrontation between the Western and Communist systems.

This, indeed, is true of detente as a whole, and the proviso is particularly apparent in the East bloc tenet of peaceful coexistence, which refers to peace between countries, not between classes: Intergovernemental detente is held to intensify class struggle because it facilitates the conditions under which class struggle is deemed to flourish.

Class struggle, as Communists see it, occurs solely in capitalist countries. Intervention in class struggle by East bloc Communist Parties is an expression of proletarian solidarity and has nothing to do with intergovernmental detente.

If, on the other hand, the Western media see fit to comment critically on events in East bloc countries, such comments are deemed impermissible intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign States.

Egbert Jahn and Jiri Hromadko denote this asymmetrical state of affairs "the claim to free entry by one's own ideology to the opposing system combined with dismissal of the corresponding counter-claim."

They quote an East bloc writer who has hit on a well-nigh classical turn of phrase: "The spread of Marxism-Leninism and the propagation of the values and benefits of bona fide socialism on the one hand and the dispute with ideological anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, including preventing it from gaining a foothold in the socialist States, fully accord with both Helsinki and international detente as a whole."

The East bloc claim to a right to ward off criticism of its own domestic policies is most clearly apparent in the human rights context. The repercussions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe recur throughout the Green Paper in this context.

"An important outcome of the CSCE," Norbert Ropers notes in his summary, "is the fact that in the Final Act conditions within a society are deemed the legitimate subject of international political control.

"In addition to a number of resolutions that form part of Basket Three this applies in particular to Principle Seven and its guarantee to 'respect human rights and basic freedoms, including the freedom of ideas, creeds and convictions'."

Hans-Joachim Schütz regards the decision to hold a conference in Belgrade to review the outcome of the Helsinki Agreement as "a rudimentary procedure intended to permit public debate and control before an international body of the implementation of the human rights in question in the various countries that were party to the Agreement."

The East bloc countries which subscribed to these provisions "will no longer be able to dismiss Western allegations of breaches of human rights in the East bloc as intervention in their domestic affairs and, in their turn, as a breach of the principle of non-intervention.

"Refusal to permit the discussion of human rights problems at the CSCE follow-up conference will in itself be construed as a contravention of the Final Act."

Other countries are entitled to impose sanctions and take whatever counter-measures they feel to be appropriate in the event of a breach of international agreements that are valid instruments by the terms of reference of international law.

But the Helsinki accords do not enjoy this status. They represent, at best, an international legal convention in the making, to paraphrase Schütze.

Hans-Joachim Schütze feels that such a delicate international agreement as the Helsinki accords does not lend itself to counter-measures. Indeed, he maintains that the Helsinki signatories could be argued to have agreed to forgo sanctions of whatever kind in the event of a breach of the Final Act.

This is probably the point at which to interpose Gerda Zellentin's comment that the pressure of public opinion on the governments concerned to grant to the letter the rights to which they subscribed at Helsinki is "at least equal in efficacy to legal sanctions."

Norbert Ropers reckons that in the wake of Helsinki dissidents in the East bloc have increased both in number and in the scope of their demands, so much so that a civil rights movement can now be said to exist in Eastern Europe.

Gerda Zellentin terms the endeavours by Eastern European civil rights campaigners to breathe life into the empty phrases of their constitutions the beginnings of a "process of constitutionalisation."

Might this trend not, in the long term, prove detrimental to detente by obliging the East bloc countries to intensify their demarcation from the West?

There are critics, and this view is also to be found in the Green Paper, who sound a warning note on this score. They feel the West would be ill-advised to try to over-accelerate the pace at which the Helsinki accords are implemented. Orderly progression, they maintain, is essential.

The desire for freedom is usually accompanied by a certain spontaneity which is hard to keep in check, whereas detente, even after Helsinki and Belgrade, will remain a matter of striking a continual, delicate balance between cooperation and confrontation, between opening and demarcation.

The significance of the Helsinki Agreement is that it lays down procedural rules for this balancing-act. These must be underpinned by measures designed to inspire confidence between the blocs, and recommendations are specifically made in this respect by Wolf Graf Baudissin.

Bonn's delegation in Belgrade would do well to make note of these recommendations, but as Gerda Zellentin points out, procedural rules and conference arrangements are not alone in fostering confidence; personal contact is no less important.

"Between East and West," she writes, "the mere fact that both sides are on speaking terms with each other constitutes a significant gain in controllable security."

Mind you, John Foster Dulles and Andrei Gromyko were on speaking terms at the height of the Cold War, so it also depends on how the two sides engage in personal contact and what issues are discussed.

The Green Paper certainly includes any amount of material that should prove of use in continuing the East-West debate, not to mention suggestions as to how the two sides might best deal with each other.

Dietrich Schwarzkopf

(Die Zeit, 15 July 1977)

J. Delbrück, N. Ropers, G. Zellentin (Eds): *Grünbuch zu den Folgewirkungen der KSZE* (Green Paper on the Repercussions of the CSCE), DGFK publications, Vol. 3, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne 1977, pp 520 pp., 38 deutschmarks.

Detente deadlock

Continued from page 1

sons, in keeping up the dialogue with Moscow, while the Kremlin is keen to demonstrate how interested it still is in detente in Europe.

So oddly enough, ties between Moscow and a number of Western European countries were intensified at the very time ties between Moscow and Washington virtually ground to a halt.

These ties have not amounted to much, mind you. Bonn's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was welcomed with unusual cordiality in Moscow, but as soon as his talks came round to issues on which the two countries disagree the response was zero.

There was not the slightest prospect of rapprochement on Berlin, which Bonn still considers to be the touchstone of detente.

During his visit to Paris Mr Brezhnev made a point of appearing jovial in public, but in private talks he indulged in endless monologues that were little more than a rehash of *Pravda* leaders.

This is not, however, to underestimate the benefits that may have accrued from these encounters. In camera the respective leaders dealt with crucial issues.

Mr Brezhnev wanted to know how his opposite numbers rate President Carter and his policies, while they in their turn were keen to learn how President Brezhnev felt about the new US leader.

The Soviet Union was evidently thinking in terms of using Western European leaders as intermediaries between the Kremlin and the White House.

Encounters so far have shown how important relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are for Western Europe in general and this country in particular.

President Carter has laid the groundwork for ensuring that the United States reassumes a moral and political role in world affairs of which Europe is the beneficiary.

The President has opted for an active and dynamic foreign policy which no Bonn government can fail to welcomme, but it is nonetheless a forward policy fraught with risks for a number of America's allies.

Reconciling interests on both sides of the Atlantic is no easy matter, but Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt tried hard to accomplish this, and no less, during this recent visit to Washington.

Harry Hamm

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 15 July 1977)

The German Tribune

Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke. Editor-in-Chief: Otto Heinz, Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Henry P. Sanders. – Distribution Manager: Georgine von Platen. Advertising Manager: Peter Boeckmann.

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH. 23 Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1. Telex: 02 14733. Bonn bureau: 65 Adenauerallee, 53 Bonn, Tel.: 21 90 00. Telex: 08 86398.

Advertising rates list No. 12 – Annual subscription DM 35.

Printed by Krögers Buch- und Verlagsdruckerei, Hamburg-Blankenese. Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.

All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE reprint are published in cooperation with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are complete translations of the original text, in no way abridged nor editorially redrafted. THE GERMAN TRIBUNE also publishes quarterly supplements featuring articles selected from German periodicals.

In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

■ HOME AFFAIRS

Cabinet faces economic policy struggle in the autumn

It looks as though the political climate in Bonn this autumn is going to be ever hotter than before the summer recess.

If unemployment rises and the economic situation remains as it is, Chancellor Schmidt and his Ministers could be forced to act and these actions might have unpleasant consequences. For Schmidt and for the Free Democrats the real threat comes not from the Christian Democrats, but from those in their own ranks who disagree with their policies.

Not only FDP Economics Minister Friderichs, but also his Party chairman Genscher, SPD Finance Minister Apel and last, but not least, the Chancellor himself will all find themselves in an awkward position.

They will either have to intervene and thus lose their free market economy reputation or they will have to let matters come to a head — and this would be a severe test for the ruling coalition and the two coalition parties.

The breach between the employers and the unions over the question of co-determination makes it difficult to work out a strategy which would be fair to both sides. The whole issue could easily turn into a class-confrontation which would also involve the government.

If this should happen, many observers believe that, despite all denials, Helmut Schmidt will stake everything on a Cabinet reshuffle and a government programme which will enable him to beat off any attack.

The Chancellor does not have much room for manoeuvre. The so-called left in the SPD and the FDP are aware of their strength and prepared to refuse him and his cabinet their support.

The word is going around in the government camp that Schmidt, Genscher, Friderichs and Apel are no longer strong enough to act on what they judge to be reasonable policies. The most they can hope to achieve is to prevent the unreasonable.

A typical example of the kind of dilemma they find themselves in is the dearth of effective remedies for unemployment. Ministry experts would like to follow the advice of the economic experts' council. They propose to stimulate investment by allowing companies generous depreciation write-off terms or tax-free reserves.

Cabinet politicians realise that these measures would not find a majority of supporters among their own parliamentary parties. The tug-of-war over the increase in value added tax and the lowering of wealth and trade tax have already nearly brought about the government's downfall.

They are equally unhappy about proposals to increase consumer demand by raising personal allowances. More and more wage-earners are finding that nominal wage increases hardly lead to any increase in net income, and such a move would conteract this tendency.

This spur to demand would cost industry nothing and could certainly improve its selling and profit-making prospects.

It would then be possible to impress on the unions the necessity for more moderate wage claims than they put in this year. This could probably be the key to a programme whose goal is a permanent economic upswing.

But Finance Minister Hans Apel is not prepared to go along with these proposals. The tax coffers have been so heavily plundered in the dispute about value added tax that he is not prepared to make any further tax concessions. The proposals could also lead to wrangles about comparative wealth, especially if tax reductions were to be compensated for by reducing State help for savers.

The only idea left is a reform of the state wealth-creation programme, but this has come up so often that it does not arouse much enthusiasm.

Apel and Friderichs are already negotiating with Labour Minister Ehrenberg about this. A reduction in the forms of investment which enjoy state aid is on the agenda, as is an increase in wage-earners' wealth-creating payments from 624 DM to 936 DM per annum.

The cabinet seems to be able to agree only on what should not be done. There seems to be a general consensus that any reduction in the flexible age-limit for retirement would not only be very costly, but also highly unsocial.

There is a danger that companies would not fill the vacancies that became available in this way but simply cut costs by means of further rationalisation.

It would also be unacceptable for older workers to be subjected to indirect pressure to give up their jobs. Excessive costs were also the argument against the proposal to give women a year's post-natal pay for bringing up their children. No state could guarantee to give women back their jobs after a year.

The only initiative on the employment question that remains is Ehrenberg's plan to amend the law on working hours. This would mean that works' councils would have greater powers to ensure that more workers were taken on instead of large amounts of overtime being worked.

No one in Bonn is prepared to stick his neck out and say whether this kind of defensive strategy will be enough to keep the broad front of system changers at bay this autumn.

Hans-Henning Zencke

(Kieler Nachrichten, 15 July 1977)

FDP holds key to whether 4th party will contest Euro-poll

Should the FDP stand by and do nothing while a fourth nationwide party is formed, although this could lead to an alarming change in the party scene, or should it do everything in its power to stop this development?

The party's main committee will have to consider this fateful decision at its meeting in Hamburg on 17 September. This meeting, the third of its kind in the space of a few months, was called by the party executive at its last meeting.

The subject of the main committee's next meeting will be: "Preparations for direct elections to the European Parliament." This may appear to be a routine meeting, but in reality the decision taken here will be highly significant.

If the FDP insists, as it has done up to now, on nationwide lists for the European direct elections, it will at the same time be forcing the CSU to make a crucial choice: either it will have to merge with the CDU for the purposes of the European elections or put forward its own candidates independently all over the country.

CSU General Secretary Gerold Tandler has already informed the FDP that in this event, his party will go independent and will reckon to get about 15 per cent of national votes.

CDU and CSU both wish to avoid this happening. In a joint declaration, they called on the FDP to revert to the tried and trusted system of joint state lists which is used for federal elections.

The advantages of this system are that the candidates are better known and more accessible to voters and that regional issues assume greater importance. It will also enable Berlin deputies to be integrated more inconspicuously.

The Bundesrat — including SPD members — has already announced its opposition to the government plan for national lists because of the disadvantages this would mean for Berlin.

National lists are now part of the Government's Bill although there were at first no disagreements between the parties about the advantages of state lists. The Free Democrats eventually opted for national lists and persuaded their Social Democratic coalition partners to adopt this system as well.

The FDP will only get half a dozen members at most into the European Parliament. With joint state lists they would have had difficulty ensuring safe seats for their main candidates.

If the national list system is used, this will mean that the federal executive can decide which candidates are to be nominated for seats and in what order.

Peter Hopen

(Bremer Nachrichten, 13 July 1977)

Rift between FDP leadership and left wing widens

The two main parties seem to have taken a break from their internal squabbles. No so the FDP. The conflict which had been smouldering for some time between the party leadership and its left wing has now erupted violently.

The cause of this conflict is the party's energy and economic policies, which are to be formulated for the first time at the federal party conference in November at Kiel. It is already clear that this is going to be a hot autumn for the liberals.

Economics Minister and deputy Party chairman Friderichs did not seem to be taking the matter too seriously last Monday evening. His comment was: "There are always days when one feels a bit annoyed." But he must also realise that this annoyance is not going to be a matter of days, but months.

The debate on the party's economic and energy policies is going to rage until the federal conference in November.

It is already clear that the positions of the two committees set up at the Mainz party conference, in 1975 are contradictory.

The Economic Committee headed by Friderichs has produced a paper in which the majority of its members stress market economy principles and call for measures to stimulate private investment.

The paper unanimously agreed on by all the members of the party's Policy Review Committee headed by state secretary Gerhard Baum moves in the opposite direction, favouring a more planned economy.

This breaks an old taboo. The committee, whose job was to work out long-term policy, considers that "a transition from uncontrolled expansion in the economy to qualitative growth" is necessary.

Whereas the Economic Committee rejects any move to shorten working hours or lower the retirement age, the Policy Committee is prepared to consider such measures if all others fail.

There is also disagreement between the party leadership on the question of atomic energy. This is a conflict which has been going on for some time and still has not been resolved.

Economics Minister Hans Friderichs has really invited the attacks of the left wing by his inflexible attitude and his unswerving insistence on the government's energy programme.

Helga Schuchardt, chairman of the Hamburg branch and spokeswomen of the rebellious left, demonstratively stayed away when the vote was taken on the Economic Committee's report. She also got a resolution through in the city-state executive calling on Minister Friderichs "not to move further away from the party."

The FDP spokesman made the conciliatory comment that "many would agree with Frau Schuchardt's opinions," which is an indication of how unsure of itself the party leadership is.

Yet this row has broken out astonishingly late. The economic policies which have led to this row were already in the 1971 Freiburg theses; the energy policies were in the FDP's election manifesto of 31 May 1976.

The fourth point in the Freiburg theses is: "Liberalism requires the reform of capitalism." And in more detail: "The end of the uneven and unfair distribition of economic power which is a result of the accumulation of money and the ownership of the means of production by a few."

In its election programme the FDP said that citizen's action groups should be consulted and their views taken into account when it came to the building of atomic power stations.

These bombs, which were laid some a time ago, are exploding now. It will not be possible to judge the damage they do to the FDP until we see what resolutions are passed at the party conference and how the FDP fares in the state elections in Lower Saxony and Hessen in 1978.

If the left-wing delegates win the day in Kiel, the FDP Ministers will find it difficult to entrench themselves behind cabinet decisions and government statements.

The majority of the FDP Bundestag party's still on its Ministers' side. It is also highly unlikely that Friderichs will lose his place on the executive, for the simple reason that there is no one who could take his place.

The only Cabinet Minister who has not been criticised by his own party is chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher. He is said to have warned Friderichs against putting forward his "liberal economic theses." He probably foresaw that they would only provoke a left wing revolt.

Werner Bollmann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 13 July 1977)

■ **EMPLOYMENT**

Recipes galore, but no cure for wave of joblessness

The author of this article, Hans Georg Schachtschabel, is an economist and SPD Member of Parliament.

Politicians, trade unionists and employers are agreed on one point: that the present unemployment is one of our gravest problems.

It therefore gratifying that a lively discussion is now in progress, in which a variety of proposals for the solution of the problem have been put forward.

It must, however, not be overlooked that many well-meant proposals worthy of being gone into further are inadequate to cope with structural unemployment and are therefore ineffectual in combating joblessness.

Proposals based on strict market economy concepts are essentially too simple and fail to take other elements into account. Of course we can rely on market forces and leave everything to fall into place as a result of market mechanisms.

But we must not overlook the fact that such concepts are promising only in times of economic reconstruction (as for instance after 1949) and not in times of economic saturation – especially not when such processes are considerably hampered by global factors.

Moreover, an adjustment process based on market forces requires a relatively long time, which is unacceptable – above all politically – when the prime objective is to provide relief on the labour market as soon as possible.

Necessitated by political considerations, the constant demand within the framework of such efforts (in which former measures serve as an example) is for a promotion of investment on the part of business.

But this is fallacious because it is an old truism that the inclination to invest is decisively influenced by profit expectations, and these in turn depend on the state of the order book and the predictability of potential demand.

Demands for tax relief in this connection and for reduced social security contributions (which would entail forgoing certain social achievements) are virtually ineffectual as labour policy instruments.

Experience shows that such financial relief is used by business to go even further in streamlining and automation processes. And this increases rather than diminishes the rate of unemployment.

It must also be mentioned that wage costs in the Federal Republic of Germany have risen considerably and that they now top those of the United States, let alone those of other European industrialised nations.

The consequence is the abovementioned wave of rationalisation at home and an increasing orientation of Germany's business towards production abroad.

It is significant in this connection that this country's direct investments abroad amount to DM6,000 million while foreign investments in the Federal Republic of Germany amount to a mere DM3,800 million (1976).

The possibility of reducing unemployment by means of shorter working hours – a major issue in the general debate on a possible remedy for the problem – has given rise to a great deal of fascination among the public.

There is hardly a political group which has not delved into this subject.

The essential aspects of the relevant proposals can be summed up as follows:

- Shorter daily working hours;
- Shorter weekly working hours;
- Longer annual vacation;
- Introduction or extension of vacations for further training;
- Extension of compulsory education;
- Lowering of the pensionable retirement age (different for men and women).

These proposals fail to take into account that their implementation would have virtually no effect on sectoral and regional unemployment which marks the structure of the labour market. It can be taken for certain that shorter working times provide no genuine solution and that they would at best help to gloss over the root of the problem.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the consistent implementation of one or all of the abovementioned measures to shorten working times would be irreversible. Once practised, these measures (unless they are proven wrong by their structural and economic effects) could either not be amended at all, or it would be extremely difficult to revise them.

This means that problems would not be solved, but would simply be superimposed on other problems likely to arise, and this would greatly curtail the scope of action in matters of labour market policy. As a result, it is necessary to proceed with the greatest of circumspection.

In the package of measures aimed at shortening working times, only those are worthy of consideration which fall within the realm of developments in the social policy sector.

Long-term programmes aimed at providing jobs must also be viewed with scepticism. There can be no doubt that such programmes would have some effect, but they would certainly not cure the malady.

Above all, we must always ask ourselves whether the financial expenditures needed for such programmes would lead to the desired success and whether such measures would noticeably reduce the core of unemployment.

The same applies with regard to mobility subsidies. Such subsidies are doomed to failure in all those instances where workers, for whatever reason, are disinclined to relocate – unless the measures are directed at relatively mobile single or foreign workers.

Sectorally, the retraining concept must be retained. But financial support by the state of an unemployed worker who is prepared to take on an interim job must be rejected because a certain social status still attaches to a skilled or practised trade.

As a result, the concept of interim work is a priori ineffectual because hardly anyone is likely to be prepared (even for a short time) to accept a socially lesser job – as for instance if an economist is temporarily employed as a secretary – even if such work carries the same income as a result of subsidies as the previous skilled (or not yet exercised) job.

Regionally, there are obviously considerable differences from district to district (unemployment rate in Schleswig-Holstein more than 5 per cent; in Baden-Württemberg less than 3 per cent).

But it is most unlikely that difficulties which the individual deems to be considerable (such as relocation or separation from the family) would permit mobility without friction – no matter how desirable. There, too, it is the imponderable factors which play a major role.

This raises the question of the remaining ways and means of providing jobs – disregarding the necessity of international economic cooperation and cooperation in the monetary and credit policy sectors.

To begin with, we need an exact analysis of the structure of unemployment. Mere figures concerning the rate of unemployment tell us nothing about the measures with which to combat joblessness.

What we urgently need is to switch from overall unemployment figures to detailed information about unemployment broken down according to sex and vocational and age groups. This would enable us to evolve a number of tailor-made measures for the individual sectors of unemployment.

Let us take the position of May 1977 as an example. Of the overall unemployment rate of 4.1 per cent, female workers accounted for an above-average 5.7 per cent and male workers for a below-average 3.2 per cent.

Actual conditions on the labour market become even clearer when look-

Continued on page 5


Unemployment – Problem no. 1

Numbers of jobless in the Federal Republic of Germany

Total of jobless per every thousand workers in 1976

Country	Jobless per 1000
Eire	124
Denmark	107
Belgium	86
USA	77
Italy	60
Britain	58
France	54
Holland	53
Germany	46
Austria	20
Sweden	16

GNP and jobless





■ **POLITICAL BOOKS**

A tale of missed opportunities

I am afraid we have all suffered from illusions, some more than others, and of course those of us who supported detente had more illusions than most. We all expected things to happen too quickly. We waited six months and, when what we had expected had not happened by then we started getting impatient. This is simply naive.

"We have to face political realities. We have to accept that – rightly or wrongly – the GDR needs to underline the difference between its social and political system and ours. Yet we have to go on pursuing the same basic policy, because this is the only way of finding a gradual modus vivendi between the two German states."

This is the opinion of secretary of state Günter Gaus. It is taken from an interview given to the Deutschlandfunk towards the end of 1974.

This significant quotation is to be found in Jens Hacker's book "Germans Among Themselves, The Politics of the Basic Treaty."

Shortly before I was expelled from East Berlin, a Russian journalist friend said that he thought the relationship between the two German states today reminded him of the "Grashdanskaya Voina," the civil war between Red and White Russians.

Deutsche unter sich – Politik mit dem Grundvertrag (Germans Among Themselves – The Politics of the Basic Treaty) Jens Hacker, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1976, 192 pages, DM16.

Just like the Russians of those days, the Germans of today still had great difficulty in finding a common language, despite the Basic Treaty.

Given the title, one might have expected Hacker's book to deal with the practical consequences which the Basic Treaty and subsequent agreements had had on relations between the two German States. But this is not the case. The author traces the development of Bonn's relations with the GDR from 1949 to the autumn of 1976.

This is a useful and necessary exercise, because it reminds us of the many opportunities missed, but also of the fact that Chancellors Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger all advocated measures to "alleviate human problems."

Unfortunately the governments of the time realised too late (if at all) that their claim to be the only legitimate German State could not be upheld.

Perhaps things would have been different if Adenauer had pressed harder for Russian acceptance of his 1963 plan, and if his proposals had also been more detailed. This plan envisaged an "Austrian solution" for the GDR and a ten-year truce with Moscow.

Hacker's theory that since 1945 it is impossible for the German alone to solve the German question is of course indisputable. Germany's surrender made it an international problem. We know only too well that no progress on this question can be made without the four major Powers.

Equally indisputable is the fact that the Treaty was hastily negotiated as a result of domestic political developments in Bonn. In the author's opinion it was too hastily negotiated.

Egon Bahr knows better than most that the regulations on re-uniting families, on transport from east to west and working conditions for journalists are far from perfect and that some of the imperfections could have been removed by more patient negotiating.

All those who supported the social-liberal coalition's Ostpolitik from the start really had only hope to go on. They hoped that the government in East Berlin would "relax" after it had been diplomatically recognised all over the world.

Above all the people in the GDR hoped that there would be improvements in their situation. For who in 1972 could have foreseen the extent of the demarcation politics of the GDR government today?

Who could then have guessed that, five years later, the GDR government would not hesitate to prevent its own citizens from seeing the representative of the Bonn government in Berlin, or to expel two journalists representing the Federal Republic of Germany?

The regulated co-existence which the Basic Treaty prescribes is fraught with difficulties. Relations are not good, and there can be no question of co-operation or good neighbourly relations between the two States in the foreseeable future.

Yet in the author's opinion there is no practical alternative to the policies the Bonn government has been pursuing in recent years.

Hacker's analysis basically poses this question: to what extent can citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany and those of the GDR be considered as belonging to one nation?

Egon Bahr always used to answer this question with an example. As long as a German from Frankfurt on Main can talk to a German from Frankfurt on the Oder without considering him a foreigner, and vice-versa, the Germans were one nation.

The question is whether this will still be the case in thirty years. Certainly citizens in this country can do far more to ensure the preservation of the nation than those in the GDR, whose freedom to act is so limited.

Hacker does not devote enough attention to this important and problematic aspect of Germans among themselves.

Lothar Loewe

(Die Zeit, 15 July 1977)

Lothar Loewe, TV correspondent in East Berlin, was expelled by the GDR authorities in December, 1976

How ethnic German communities have fared in the Soviet Union

The contents of this book are much more wide-ranging than the modest title implies. Bohmann deals not only with the German population and the changes of structure it has undergone in the Soviet State, he also includes the other national groups within the Soviet Union in his study.

In his introductory survey he provides copious information about these national groups, their numbers and their percentual relation to the total population and to one another. We see that there are 114.11 million Russians and 37.25 million Ukrainians, 6 million Uzbekans as against 4.9 million Tartars.

This survey includes even very small national minorities. For example in 1959 there were 106,000 Ingushans, 223,000 Lesginians and 203,000 Kabardinians.

Another feature of this work which goes beyond the scope of the title is the division of Soviet citizens into their various national and language groups and the percentual calculation of the Russian population in the Soviet republics.

The central subject of this treatise is, however, the numerical strength of Soviet citizens of German origin before the first world war, between the wars, and after the second world war.

It also looks at the fate of the various German national groups in the Russian settlement areas and the present situation of these groups in Russia.

The total number of Germans living in the Russian Empire in 1914 was 2,416,000. The number living in the Soviet Union in 1959 was 1,619,700 – a marked decrease. In the census of 1926 only 1,238,500 Germans were counted, just over a half of the 1914 population.

The largest number of the German-speaking population (i.e. 600,000) lived then as now in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, followed by the Volga and Black Sea areas with 500,000 in each about, 400,000 in Congress Poland and about 300,000 in the Ukraine.

Three quarters of this last 700,000 have to be subtracted when the effects of the German war campaign in Russia are taken into account. In August 1941 Volga and Odessa Germans were forcibly resettled in Novosibirsk, Omsk, Kasakstan and the Altai area.

Many died en route, many merged into their new environment, losing their national identity. Others were resettled by the Reich government after the German troops advanced into Russia. Bohmann estimates that 341,000 came into this last category.

The second world war meant not only an extremely high mortality rate for Russian Germans. It also meant the end of the national groups as entities with their own political and cultural identity; 250 Volga German schools were forced to close and their 503 political communities were broken up.

Strukturwandel der deutschen Bevölkerung im Sowjetischen Staat – und Verwaltungsbereich (Structural changes among the German population in the Soviet State), by Alfred Bohmann, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne, 427 pages, DM79.

Nineteen years after the end of the war, in August 1964, a decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR abolished the 1941 measures for forcible resettlement.

This of course did not mean the reestablisment of the autonomous Socialist – Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans and the Germans dispersed outside the Volga region proper. In other words it did not make possible the complete rehabilitation of Soviet citizens of German nationality.

Most of the Soviet citizens of German origin who were resettled in Siberia in 1941/1942 remained there. According to Alfred Bohmann, more than 63,000 Russian Germans emigrated to the west after 1945. The vast majority of these (52,000), came to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1,100 to the GDR and more than 9,000 went overseas.

The Russian Germans who remained in Siberia have adapted to their situation fairly well in the meantime and have reached a reasonable standard of living.

In his numerous tables Bohmann gives an overall picture of the rural Siberian Germans way of life.

According to this 52 per cent of all houses are of reed, the roofs are of slate. Sixty-six per cent of the German families have a radio, fourty-two per cent have a washing machine, twenty two per cent have television and twenty three per cent own a motorcycle. Their share of these consumer goods is above average, so that it can be said that the Russian Germans are no worse off than the rest of the Siberian population, including Russians.

The same is true of the German population in the western parts of East Prussia, the Baltic and East Poland which were annexed by the Russians in 1945. Bohmann estimates their numbers at 80,000, though it was difficult to make an accurate assessment on the basis of the documents available.

The author has been at great pains to provide complete and accurate figures and information in this book. It is an extremely useful work of reference.

Bohmann rounds off his treatise with historical accounts of the origins of the German settlements after each of the eleven chapters, as well as a list of secondary literature in the appendix.

Alfred Schickel

(Die Welt, 2 July 1977)

Continued from page 4

ing at part-time workers. The unemployment rate in that sector amounts to a total of 11.4 per cent, with men accounting for a mere 1.1 per cent and women for 12.6 per cent.

This makes it obvious that, based on detailed information about the structure of unemployment, measures must be evolved which would be custom-tailored for particularly badly affected groups of unemployed workers. If it turns out that there is a shortage of jobs for women wanting to work part-time it is obvious that only measures specifically aimed at that sector can be effective.

Furthermore, there is the problem of unemployment among older white-collar workers, caused primarily by automation. These jobless can also not be provided with work by mere overall measures because it is unlikely that white-collar workers will be prepared to work as ditch-diggers or in road construction gangs.

And then there is the grave problem of the young unemployed (now amounting to 2.6 per cent) which is aggravated by the fact that another 200,000 apprenticeships will be needed by 1980. As a result, this group, too, needs more than just educational measures. What is called for is purpose-oriented policies aimed specifically at the young.

Although overall employment programmes generally stimulate the labour market and might even help overcome partical bottlenecks, those groups of jobless which are particularly in need of specific employment policies remain unaffected.

As a result, what we need is to abolish traditional employment policies and the ineffectual practices of a general nature.

Instead, we need a carefully thought out and well balanced package of custom-designed measures which would provide relief for those groups of unemployed which are particularly beset by problems.

Once we have arrived at this realisation it should be relatively easy to reach agreement on specific procedures and their financial implementation.

(Wirtschaftswoche, 15 July 1977)

ECONOMICS

Economy takes a zig-zag course towards its growth target

It can only be termed odd if authorities such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the Federation of German Industry admit that they are somewhat at a loss when it comes to establishing the nation's economic position and forecasting future developments.

Due to the evident shortcomings of official industrial statistics (the change in the statistical method has not yet been overcome) they maintain, it is impossible to pinpoint the development of demand.

The Federation of German Industry raises the question whether diminishing demand in the first half of this year was of a passing nature or whether it already presaged a slump.

But in actual fact overall demand in the first half of the year was not smaller, but greater. All that happened was that the growth rate failed to meet expectations.

According to generally accepted estimates, the real GNP (seasonally adjusted) rose by 4 per cent in the first quarter of this year. Government anticipated a growth of between 4 and 5 per cent for the year as a whole.

This means that we are not far off the envisaged target — especially since it can be expected that business will pick up in the second half of the year and that this will not be merely seasonal.

Stronger impulses can be expected not only in the export and consumption sectors, but also in investment activities.

Moreover, in assessing the growth rate during the first half of the year it must be taken into account that considerable successes were achieved on the anti-inflation front (the cost of living index is rising at half the rate of three years ago) and that the state of government finances (Federal, state and municipal) has clearly improved... all of which initially has a dampening effect on growth.

Another important aspect to bear in mind is that the growth rate lag is to some extent also due to the structural adjustment processes necessitated by the level of wage costs.


These include losses of investment capital, diminishing turnover, shrinking production capacities, gradual liquidation of entire production sectors and the loss of jobs resulting from it — all of which had to be compensated for. What remains is the general growth rate.

World trade developed in a lively fashion during the first half of the year. Trading activities of the major industrialised nations, especially the United States and Japan, belie pessimistic forecasts.

They have developed at a greater rate than was generally considered feasible. Balance of payments crises failed to materialise and there has been a general improvement in such balances.

Foreign orders of the Federal Republic of Germany's industry, which showed a slight drop at the beginning of the year, have clearly picked up again.

The volume of this country's exports in the first half of 1977 showed an increase of close to 9 per cent over the same period last year. A further improvement is to be anticipated in the second half of the year.



But even if there were no change in the development and if exports were to continue at the same rate as in the first six months of this year, we would still achieve an annual volume of DM277,000 million — compared with DM257,000 million last year.

The exports efforts on the part of our business are particularly laudable considering the handicaps. Among these are the continuing revaluation of the deutschmark which makes our goods ever more expensive for foreign buyers and, above all, our wage level, which ranks among the highest in the world, as well as the remarkably bad tax position of our business.

Since the beginning of this year, the Ifo Institute has from month to month maintained that the business prospects of our industry have been deteriorating.

It therefore came as a surprise that, according to the latest Ifo polls, industry's investment programmes for the current year had to be corrected upwards. Although this is out of keeping with Ifo's bleak forecasts it is confirmed by statistics of the Association of German Mechanical Engineering Companies.

According to these statistics, domestic orders of machinery in May showed a clear increase. In the first six months of 1977 they amounted to 11 per cent more in real terms than a year earlier, reaching an increase by 13 per cent in May.

While streamlining and automation investments dominated until recently, there is now a clear tendency towards expansion investments.

In order to support this positive trend it would only be right to provide better depreciation write-offs. The Ifo Institute, too, has recently adopted this view — after other organisations and also the Ministry of Economic Affairs strongly recommended that investments be supported by tax policy measures.

So far, however, Government decisions in this direction have foundered on the ideological stalemate between the two coalition parties.

The FDP considers major taxation measures in favour of investments as the necessary basis of further economic growth, increased production and — above all — new jobs. The SPD, on the other hand, views these plans and the measures they would entail as a form of unwarranted enrichment of business.

The development of consumption this year has been disappointing. The hope of impulses resulting from increased mass incomes, increased pensions and, above all, the additional DM25,000 to DM35,000 million resulting from the Government-subsidised savings that are falling due failed to materialise.

The turnover of the retail trade (which reflects only about half of consumer spending) rose nominally by just under 6 per cent and by a mere 2 per cent in real terms over the same period last year.

On the other hand, the abovementioned additional money was certainly partially used for purchases of durable consumer goods — above all automobiles — for added spending for home furnishings (which profited the furniture business) and also for considerable expenditures for travel and vacations.

In any event, it can be assumed that after reinvestment of the roughly DM17,000 million due from maturing savings contracts on 1 July 1977 there will still remain a certain amount of buying power which will take effect in the course of the year.

The turnover of the retail trade on the first late-closing day of the stores in July was exceptionally lively and exceeded the previous year's trading by up to 20 per cent.

The recent voices of pessimism are primarily due to reports from the labour market. The fact is that structural unemployment has increased from month to month this year. According to the Labour Office, June's unemployment figure (seasonally adjusted) was calculated at 1,034,000.

This figure will continue to grow and there is nothing new about this realisation.

The reasons for this development are of a structural nature, and it is therefore impermissible to draw economic conclusions from labour market statistics.

Although much is being said and written about unemployment as the number one problem, the Bonn Government has not even begun to develop a strategic concept for a return to full employment although it is no secret how this objective could be reached.

What is called for is a change in the use of the GNP, a restoration of the balance in cost-yield relations and an effective programme for even further promotion of our exports. There is no other wwy of achieving full employment in our capital goods industry.

Let us make a concrete proposal: How about Bonn deciding to totally restructure its trade policy department in the Foreign Office and reshuffling the staff of the trade departments of German embassies abroad?

Career diplomats, lawyers and trade agreement specialists working in such departments should be replaced by shirt-sleeved practitioners, businessmen, engineers and financing experts — and even if they are not replaced by them, they should at least be supported by them.

Perhaps it would then be possible to replace routine bureaucratic situation reports with concrete proposals and projects which would open up new vistas for our exports.

Walter Slotosch

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 July 1977)

Booster plan means Bonn getting deeper into debt


In view of the continued weakness of the economy, the Government should increase its indebtedness by another 10 per cent by taking up credits in order to stabilise demand next year.

Moreover, as Finance Minister Hans Apel said in Bonn recently, no cuts in spending are envisaged despite Bonn's financial concessions to the various states in distributing tax revenues.

According to initial plans, the governments' (Federal, state and municipal) credits will reach about DM40,000 million next year (of which Bonn will take up DM27,000 million, the states DM9,000 million and the municipalities DM4,000 million.

This, Herr Apel said, is in keeping with the economic situation and would be slightly above this year's indebtedness of DM36,000 million.

The increase in indebtedness is primarily necessitated by the DM16,000 million investment programme, of



which at least DM3,000 million are to be reflected in this year's order books.

Herr Apel pointed out, however, that the Financial Planning Council should speed up matters somewhat.

Next year's Budget envisages spendings of DM184,700 million with a new indebtedness of DM19,700 million. This entails an increase of between 8.5 and 9 per cent rather than the originally envisaged 7.5 per cent.

Herr Apel drew attention to the fact that, due to the turnover tax negotiations between Bonn and the states, Bonn will have to accept a higher indebtedness than originally planned.

According to the Finance Ministry's own estimates, 1978 tax revenues should be about DM2,000 million greater than anticipated. Another 1,000 to 2,000 million deutschmarks could be achieved by economy measures and small revenue increases.

The missing balance of about DM4,000 to DM5,000 million would have to be financed by additional credits, which could rise to DM24,000 or DM25,000 million next year. This would be the maximum constitutionally permissible limit.

In the Financial Planning Council the states managed to achieve a commitment on the part of Bonn to revert to a common basis for bugetary planning.

The states pointed out, however, that they consider themselves inadequately informed by Bonn concerning the development of tax revenues. This was pointed out by the chairman of the Finance Ministers' Conference of the states, Johann Wilhelm Gaddum.

Herr Apel expects an aggravation of the conflict concerning the future distribution of tax revenues between Bonn and the states. He expressed concern over the fact that the states leave Bonn less and less financial scope and raised the question as to the constitutionality of the horse-trading about the tax cake.

Peter Gillies

(Die Welt, 9 July 1977)

FINANCE

The US dollar — a reserve currency without reserves

Johannes Tüngeler, the author of this article, was until March, 1976, a board member of the Bundesbank and member of the Central Bank Council. Prior to his retirement, he was in charge of the Bundesbank's Foreign Exchange Department.

United States Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal has lately used every opportunity to recommend to the strong currency nations that they up their exchange rates.

The recommendations are addressed primarily to the deutschmark and the yen. The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, he maintains, have excessive trade surpluses and should curb their exports by upvaluing their rate of exchange, which would at the same time lead to increased imports.

Only thus, Mr Blumenthal argues, could countries with a weak balance of payments reduce their deficits and only thus could the threatening insolvency of some countries be averted. The United States, he points out, already has a considerable trade deficit and has thus made its contribution in that direction.

It is not our intention to delve into the weakness of Mr Blumenthal's arguments concerning his own country's good behaviour in balance of payments matters. This has already been done in a convincing fashion in other articles which pointed to the imbalance of America's balance of trade with the Arab countries resulting from the explosive rise of oil prices.

We are primarily concerned with the total lack of concern with wiich the US Secretary of the Treasury believes that he should provide impulses in achieving changes on the foreign exchange markets. We have experienced time and again how members of governments intentionally or unintentionally toss out remarks — in some instances aimed at setting foreign exchange markets in motion.

Where such remarks were unintentional, the market viewed them as useful information and even reacted to them, soon reverting to normal business unless such remarks are followed up by deeds (as by re- or devaluation).

Moreover, many verbal slips of those in positions of responsibility could be excused as long as the absolutely free foreign exchange market, which is open to money and capital movements, was still in a development stage. But since the introduction of full convertibility of the major currencies it took those concerned years before they fathomed the possibilities of the market.

Intentional remarks aimed at influencing exchange rates have disturbed the market considerably since it was always taken for granted that there were certain political intentions (mostly in the realm of trade policy) behind such remarks. This usually resulted in jams in foreign exchange trading.

To start with, speculative elements tested the central banks of the currencies in question by putting forward exchange rates which the market eventually accepted.

By sounding out the attitudes of central banks speculators attempted to receive additional information until new speeches by politicians (frquently interpreted in entirely opposite ways) finally cleared the jam.

For those participants who are most interested in a smooth operation of the market — exporters and importers — such attempts at influencing the market resulted in additional costs, be it by unforeseen drops or increases in the exchange rate or be it by additional safeguard costs against exchange rate fluctuations.

The effects of such intented or unintended interference in the foreign exchange market have (since the introduction of convertibility) also been felt by the central banks.

Until the end of the system of fixed exchange rates, this led to exceptional fluctuations (due to the necessity of intervention) with their effects on domestic money markets and internal monetary stability.

But even after the introduction of flexible exchange rates all the way to today's floating system and the more controlled Snake concept, the central banks had no choice but to exert their stabilising influence on the market.

As opposed to the first years of free exchange markets — and this should be borne in mind when making verbal excursions into exchange rate problems, especially after the oil price increases — a relatively short-term money market potential has evolved. Its movements frequently temporarily by far exceed the traditional export and import settlements.

It is extremely difficult for the central banks to estimate the possible movements of this huge money volume To aggravate matters still further, their function of bringing order into and achieving a frictionless functioning of trade on foreign exchange markets is hampered by sudden mammoth transfers.

As a defence measure, so to speak, the central banks stepped up cooperation with each other. Technical installations enable them to meet for conferences within minutes (electronically), and such meetings have become daily routine.

Automatic drawing rights of everybody on everybody else provide liquidity in the needed currency where the Snake currencies are concerned.

Where considerable amounts of one currency not belonging to the Snake are thrown on the market one-sidedly the home central bank will try to prevent an excessive drop by making use of its own foreign exchange reserves whenever this seems indicated. This makes it obvious that a hefty reserve cushion is beneficial in such cases.

There is, however, one exception — the US Federal Reserve Bank. The Federal Reserve Bank (and this might come as a surprise to many) is in no position to support the dollar by means of a foreign exchange cushion of its own since it has no such cushion worth mentioning.

According to US regulations, the Federal Reserve Bank's foreign exchange reserves are still made up of gold, and only for the execution of current payment orders may the Federal Reserve Bank maintain certain foreign exchange amounts — but this must not involve a risk of fluctuation in the exchange rate.

As a result of an initiative by Charles Coombs, the former head of the Bank's Foreign Department, the Federal Reserve Bank proposed at an early stage to the major central banks that it and the other central banks lend each other the necessary foreign exchange in the form of swap deals. All such drawings presuppose the approval of the central bank concerned and are envisaged as short-term deals only.

When the US Secretary of the Treasury, as mentioned earlier, recommends that the yen and the deutschmark be upped he is obviously prepared to accept a weakening of the dollar since domestic and foreign holders of dollars would sell that currency for the other two.

This might fit into the present concept of the US Government, which would thus provide one more example of exerting influence on the market by non-market forces.

But what is to happen if there were to be an over-reaction in the process of weakening the dollar — as has happened before?

In all likelihood the central banks intended as dollar recipients would try to put the brakes on the erratic drop of the dollar by intervention purchases. And who is to say whether the United States would not be part of such actions by means of foreign exchange obtained through swap deals.

It would be much more convincing if the Federal Reserve Bank were to be placed in a position to defend its currency, like all other central banks, by foreign exchange reserves of its own instead of leaving the support of the dollar to foreign central banks.

Johannes Tüngeler

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 July 1977)

Strength of the deutschmark will hit export returns

Latest developments on foreign exchange markets this year are likely to curtail profits for the Federal Republic of Germany's business.

This is the view expressed by representatives of major German companies in the export business, such as AEG-Telefunken, BASF, Bayer, Hoechst and VW following the latest drop in the dollar.

With an anticipated export volume of more than DM270,000 million this year, foreign exchange losses and diminished profits will, according to estimates, amount to DM10,000 million this year.

As indicated by daily Bundesbank statistics about the DM value abroad, the deutschmark has risen globally by 17.9 per cent since 1975. This means that foreign importers now have to pay about 18 per cent more for German goods than they paid 18 months ago. But German exporters get not a penny more in export yields.

Based on this year's export volume, the higher cost of the deutschmark will make German exports more expensive by DM48,000 million per annum.

Vis-a-vis the currencies of the 16 countries quoted at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market through which virtually the whole foreign trade of this country takes place, the deutschmark has risen by as much as 18.8 per cent since 1975.

In view of stepped-up competition on international markets, it will be impossible to maintain export prices due to the steep rise of the deutschmark. This country's exporters have to yield to foreign demands to reduce their prices by the ratio of the DM upvaluation.

The thus engendered diminished profits have an adverse effect on export-intensive branches of industry which find it difficult to offset such losses on the stagnating domestic market.

Government and Bundesbank circles have up to now maintained that German exporters — considering their leading position in the world and the excellent reputation of German goods — were in a position to cope with losses engendered by the strength of the deutschmark.

But since global competition has become fiercer such optimism can now no longer be justified.

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 13 July 1977)

Development aid falls short of UN target

The volume of the Federal Republic of Germany's development aid to the Third World exceeds that of the East bloc combined, plus China.

According to the magazine "Financing and Development", published by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, this country spent a total of DM21,300 million in governmental development aid during the period from 1970 to 1975, while the Soviet Union, China and the communist states of Eastern Europe spent a total of DM19,300 million.

Of the total development aid during that period, amounting to almost DM 240,000 million, the West provided 83 per cent — this country's share being 9 per cent. The oil-producing nations provided 8.7 per cent and the East bloc 8.1 per cent.

In 1975 the share of the communist countries dropped to a mere 4 per cent. Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, thus ranked below individual countries such as Holland, Sweden or Canada.

Although the material aid of the East bloc is clearly at odds with the bloc's constant assurances of support for the developing countries, the West has no reason to be smug over its generous, let alone excessive, foreign aid.

This applies in particular to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Although Bonn accepted the UN target of government development aid amounting to 0.7 per cent of the GNP, last year's assistance by Bonn amounted to a mere 0.31 per cent of the GNP.

Only Sweden and Holland achieved the 0.7 per cent target in the first half of the seventies. (Sweden even exceeded it, providing close to 0.8 per cent).

Compared with the UN target, the performance of the United States and Japan — with 0.25 per cent each — is also rather pathetic.

But even in this percentage scale, the USSR ranks pretty much at the bottom with 0.08 per cent and Eastern Europe barely achieves 0.02 per cent.

At first glance, the overall volume of aid amounting to close to DM 240,000 million seems impressive.

But the following figures show how moderate the helpfulness of the countries providing such aid really is: While the West's GNP rose by 11 per cent in real terms from 1970 to 1975, their development aid in real terms stagnated. In fact, the value of the West's development aid compared with the GNP even diminished where the industrialised nations are concerned from 0.53 % in 1961 to 0.36 per cent in 1975. *dpa*

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 13 July 1977)

■ SPACE RESEARCH

Exhaustive trials under way to pick European Spacelab astronaut

More than six hundred people applied to the German Aerospace Research Institute a few months ago in response to newspaper advertisements for would-be astronauts.

After initial screening a mere 25 have been shortlisted for exhaustive trials at the institute's aviation medicine research laboratories in Bad Godesberg, near Bonn.

Yet even if all pass the tests with flying colours only one of the applicants stands a chance of manning the European Spacelab on its inaugural mission in 1980.

The launcher vehicle, the Space Shuttle, will be piloted by Americans, and one of the two payload specialists on board will also be a Nasa astronaut.

But the other will be Western Europe's first man in space, and he (or she) may come from any of the member-countries of the European Space Agency.

Initial screening soon drastically reduced the ranks of the 600 applicants, one in ten of whom, incidentally, were women. Evaluation of questionnaires put paid to a good many chances.

Only 150 candidates underwent the first psychological tests, starting in mid-May. Spacelab crew members must be level-headed and tend neither to overrate themselves nor to suffer from inferiority complexes.

During a seven-day space mission they will be enclosed in a confined and strange environment alongside other members of the crew. They may only have to pull levers and press buttons in accordance with prearranged schedules, but there must be no mistakes and no tantrums.

Communications between crew members must proceed without the slightest hitch, so would-be Spacelab astronauts will, to start with, have to speak flawless English.

Since the end of June candidates have also been referred to the Luftwaffe's aviation medicine research unit in Fürstenfeldbruck, near Munich, for a thorough check-up of heart and circulation, kidneys, lungs and hearing.

The Luftwaffe has the requisite facilities. It obviously makes sense to have candidates screened by the armed forces' medical corps.

The remaining two dozen or so candidates on the short list will now be put through their paces in groups of five or six over the next few weeks at Bad Godesberg.

There they will undergo five-day courses during which conditions in space will be simulated as accurately as is possible on terra firma.

Gravitational pull during take-off and landing can wreak havoc with the circulation, resulting in a blackout. In the Bad Godesberg centrifuge would-be astronauts will be exposed to up to three times the force of gravity for as long as half an hour in accordance with Nasa requirements.

During the entire space mission astronauts will have to cope with weightlessness, which can only be simulated for a few seconds at a time in the Earth's atmosphere.

For three days in succession candidates fly loops on board single-engined aircraft. In the course of each loop they experience a state of weightlessness for several seconds.

In anticipation of this unusual sensation their bodies are studded with electrodes to measure their physical reaction to the state of weightlessness.

Their sense of equilibrium must on no account be sent haywire by either zero gravity or the unaccustomed optical surroundings. An astronaut who is continually subject to dizzy spells cannot do his job properly.

So the candidates are also subjected to optical trials and sent spinning in rotating chairs in accordance with computer programmes with a view to ensuring, as far as can possibly be ascertained beforehand, that they will not feel dizzy during the mission.



A would-be astronaut undergoing tests in Bad Godesberg (Photo: DFVLR)

But there can be no guarantee on this point. US astronauts have suffered from spacesickness for hours in orbit despite passing laboratory tests with flying colours, and a pill to relieve specesickness has yet to be discovered.

By 1 September a panel of doctors, psychologists and specialists in other disciplines will submit a short list of five would-be astronauts from this country to the European Space Agency in Paris.

Esa will subject them to further trials, selecting half a dozen candidates from the hopefuls nominated by the various member-countries.

Nasa will have the last word, however. Europe's would-be astronauts for the first Spacelab mission will be reduced to a single candidate, plus one stand-in in case he or she falls ill at the last minute. Will the others have undergone all these trials in vain? Not necessarily. The men and women finally shortlisted will be the squad from whose number further Spacelab crews will be selected for missions throughout the eighties.

Claus Albrecht

(Die Welt, 9 July 1977)

There's still no pill to combat jet lag

Jet lag can prove problematic if you have to take pills or tablets three times a day. This may not seem much of a problem if you are in the pink of condition, but if you are more or less dependent on an injection at regular intervals a succession of time zones can leave you disoriented and biologically upsets.

After a while the body compensates for the interruption in its natural rhythm, but pills and injections must be staggered accordingly.

The greater the jet lag, the longer it takes. If you overfly more than ten time zones your body may need up to four days to adjust to the change. A difference in time of a mere two or three hours can be offset in a day or so.

It is all a matter of biological rhythm. The most self-evident biological sequence is the pattern of waking hours and sleep, since we all know when a few hours' shut-eye are what we need.

But Man's "inner clock" is a more complicated mechanism than the uninitiated might suspect. At night the blood pressure is automatically reduced, and even in the course of the day physical performance varies in accordance with a fairly regular pattern.

Heartbeat varies, so do breath intake patterns and body temperatures. What is more, the efficacy of many medicines depends on this natural rhythm. They only have the required effect if taken at appropriate intervals.

A number of useful hints are listed by Lufthansa's senior medical officer, Dr Braak, in his *Ärztlicher Ratgeber für Flugreisende* (Medical Advice for Air Travellers), published by Garuda Verlag, Darmstadt.

His first point is that no one, not even the healthiest of persons, is at his or her best during the post-flight period of adjustment. There is no such thing as a pill to combat jet lag, although many patent medicines are reckoned to do so.

If you are flying east Dr Braak reckons your best bet is to get in as much sleep as possible, even taking a mild sedative if need be. On arrival you will then find it much easier to adjust to the time difference.

If, on the other hand, you are flying during the daytime to New York (or indeed San Francisco or Los Angeles) it would be better to stay awake on board and get in the sleep you need on arrival in the United States.

But you should postpone sleep until the appropriate time at your North American destination. If you go to bed the moment you arrive you are sure to wake up in the middle of the night and be unable to get back to sleep again.

Dr Braak's book contains tables indicating his advice to a variety of pill-takers flying east or west. Take, for instance, diabetics who need an injection rather than a pill.

Chronic diabetics nowadays either take an insulin jab first think in the morning or take two jabs, one in the morning and the other (usually the weaker dose) last thing at night.

Imagine, say, that you are a one-shotter flying from Europa to the west coast of North America. Dr Braak's advice is easy to remember. Take an interim jab of insulin before landing in Montreal, he says, the advantage being that dinner is then served.

If, on the other hand, you are used to

Continued on page 16

■ EDUCATION

International Montessori congress discusses how children can be helped

There is so much talk about democracy, freedom and human rights, but children are made into slaves ... the child is the forgotten citizen." Maria Montessori, the woman who said this, was not just talking about the child's right to the free development of its personality.

Throughout her life she fought for "the people without rights" and defended children against "tyrannical adults." In this struggle she was trying to lay the foundations for a more humane society.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the philosophy of teaching to which she gives her name was forbidden in her country when Mussolini came to power. Maria Montessori emigrated to Spain. Franco's civil war forced her to emigrate again, this time to Holland. When Hitler's armies invaded that country, she went to India, finally returning to Holland after the war.

There she worked tirelessly to realise her ideas until she died in 1952. The eighteenth international Montessori congress in Munich is proof that her work is being carried on by doctors, psychologists, teachers and other social workers all over the world.

Theodor Hellbrügge, director of the children's centre in Munich, as well as chairman of the "Sunshine campaign," and for many years a passionate advocate of Montessori methods, explained why the "dottoressa" had become one of the leading educationists of the twentieth century.

The decisive experience in her life came when she was working as an assistant in a Rome lunatic asylum. There she observed a group of mentally subnormal children who were crowded together like prisoners.

The superintendant made no secret of the fact that she disliked these patients. When asked why, she explained her aversion with the remark: "The minute these children have eaten, they rush to pick up the crumbs."

Maria Montessori soon realised the reason for this behaviour: the children simply had nothing else to do.

She concluded from her observations that mental retardation was primarily a pedagogical and not a medical problem.

In her attempts to find a suitable educational method of dealing with this problem, Maria Montessori came across the writings of Edouard Séguin, who had become known for his work with the "wolf boy", a child who had been brought up by animals.

Taking Séguin's work as a basis and building on it, Maria Montessori developed special didactic material and programmes. With these, subnormal children learned to read and write so well that they could hold their own with children from normal schools.

But the young doctor was not satisfied with this success. She asked herself why normal children did not achieve higher levels of attainment than the subnormal children she taught, and she came to the conclusion that the full development of human abilities is prevented by grave mistakes of methodology made in schools.

Maria there upon began to study psychology and the theory of education. With the methods she had used on handicapped children she wanted systematically to develop a scientific educational concept.

Mario Montessori, her grandson, went over her findings. Man's real birth in fact begins after his physical birth. The environment and the group in which a child grows up determine what kind of person it will become.

What Maria Montessori intuitively realised, is today accepted as a scientific fact: there are periods of development in which particular abilities are acquired. If they are not acquired at these times, they never will be.

Experience with deaf and dumb children, for example, shows that they cannot learn to speak after the age of four. The decisive phase in the development of the motor system comes in the first eight months. Cerebral motor disorders therefore have to be recognised within this period.

This is why for example there is little that treatment can do for spastics. Behaviour patterns are basically established in the first three years of life. If there is a lack of continuity and stability in social relations during this time, as is often the case with "home children", permanent behaviour problems and disorders arise.

Mainz paediatrician Johannes Pechstein estimates that a third of all children in Germany are not adequately looked after in the decisive phase of their life, because they are not living in intact families.

The reason for this was not a misplaced form of emancipation, but inadequate material security in young families and general ignorance of the child's real needs.

The results of this social deprivation are: loss of emotional contact and involvement, personality defects, a non-existent system of values and an underdeveloped sense of guilt in children when they have done something wrong.

Pechstein goes on to argue that a distorted relationship between the child and others in early childhood can bring about a distortion in the child's conception of what is his and what belongs to others. In later life this can lead to conflicts with the law. There was a proven connection between inadequate attention in the first three years of life and criminality in later years.

So the child is still "the forgotten citizen." This was particularly true in the case of physically and mentally handicapped children, who are simply pushed into homes and special schools. The Munich example shows that they can be socially integrated and are capable of learning far more in the process than the majority of the population give them credit for.

Montessori methods of teaching have been shown to be sound. Modern research in behaviour theory, neurophysiology and learning psychology have confirmed the basic theory on which she built up her system.

Children can for example learn to grasp numbers by grasping and feeling specially designed objects. Training a child's senses also develops cognitive processes. Maria Montessori described this decades ago, calling it "muscle memory". The word for it today is kinaesthetic perception.

This means that changes in its immediate environment which the child has brought about by his own motor activity form the basis of cognitive processes. The child discovers the connection between his own movement and the change which has taken place, an indication of what the next movement should be.

If this then leads to the desired result, the child is happy. This is a kind of inner reward. Satisfaction at its own success leads the child to repeat the activity.

In this way children learn to work on their own. They can decide themselves what they want to do, whether they want to sit or lie down when doing it, how long they want to take for it.

Each child's performance is noted in a book, but no marks are given. Pupils do not repeat classes. Hellbrügge; "The competition and pressure to achieve good marks which you find in normal schools simply does not exist in the Munich model school."

Yet the standards of normal children are at least as good as those of children with fixed timetables. Handicapped children — about twenty-five per cent of each class — are way ahead of their fellow-sufferers in special schools.

As well as autodidactic learning by trial and error there is also learning by imitation. A given item in the programme is only dealt with once, so children are encouraged to imitate and co-operate with one another. They also prefer to be shown things which they cannot yet do by other children rather than by adults.

A film on the "Sunshine campaign" school experiment shown for the first time in Munich showed how naturally this kind of mutual help comes to children. Even children with severe behavioural problems or severly mentally handicapped children were accepted quite naturally as part of the group.

Each child shows consideration for the others' needs. Karin, for example, is blind, but she insists on painting a red picture. No one tries to tell her that she cannot do so.

Maria Montessori anticipated another important finding of modern learning theory: cognitive learning processes are reinforced by social relationships. The interaction between teacher and pupil is more important than what *is* being taught.

Maria Montessori said that the teacher always had to be ready to give help "but should never be an obstacle between the child and its own experience... Wait and observe — that is the teacher's motto."

Jürgen-Peter Stössel

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 July 1977)

Experts report on causes of fear and stress in schools

Stress is a fashionable word nowadays. Stress at work, stress at the steering wheel, stress caused by noise. The general public and scientific experts have been concerned about this problem for some years now.

Stress occurs when the individual is subjected to more pressure than he can take. In recent years attention has focussed on the problem of stress at school and this has rapidly become a subject of some controversy.

The Bonn government takes this discussion very seriously. It has asked several experts in the field to report on the subject. The idea behind this is to "make the discussion more scientific and factual and to find out the causes of school stress", in the words of Education Minister Helmut Rohde.

Seven experts in all were commissioned to write reports on stress which children and adolescents are subjected to at school. They examined the subject from physiological, psychiatric, pedagogic and psychological, didactic and organisation viewpoints.

Pressures on children outside school were also taken into account. The experts have completed their research and presented their findings to the minister.

Rohde summarised their conclusions as follows: "The reports have confirmed the supposition that 'stress at school' is a subject which cannot be understood in the context of the school alone. It can only be properly understood by considering the whole of society, the rapid changes taking place and the many influence to which children, teachers and parents are subjected from all sides."

Before going into details, the scientists come to two noteworthy conclusions, that take the wind out of the sails of those who think they know all the answers.

1. The experts are unanimous that there is no evidence to sustain criticisms of recent school reforms. On the other hand, research findings do not conclusively prove that these reforms have a beneficial effect.

2. The experts point out that even in the nineteenth century there were warnings about excessive work-loads for school pupils. Parents and doctors have always tended to take up sides against school and, above all, against teachers.

Today the fronts have changed, and all three groups have joined forces to oppose measures brought in by the school administration: teacher shortages, over-large classes, lessons not given, etc.


One possible reason for the increased discussion about stress in chools is that parents are directly affected by changes in the educational system.

They suggest, for example, that many complaints come from parents who fear that their children will no longer be able to enjoy the educational privileges and advantages which they themselves had, e.g. smooth passage through the Abitur (school leaving exam.)

The experts then give the results of their researches and make certain recommendations:

- Work places at school are mostly not "optimal." This leads to discomfort and tiredness. Poorly designed school furniture, poor lighting and airconditioning, and excessive background noise are named as causes.
- Pupils' working hours are often too long. There is an imbalance between the time allotted to lessons and that so breaks. The effective working time (teaching time plus breaks plus the journey to and from school plus the extra hours of sleep which children need) means that children have far less free time than they should have.
- Schools do not do enough to encourage physical activities. There is not

Continued on page 11



Continued from page 10

enough sport at school, and leisure facilities outside school do not compensate for this lack. The experts add that pupils spend far too much time watching television.

- The number of children in a class schould be drastically reduced to a maximum of 20. All the experts laid particular emphasis on this point.
- They recommend that all-day schools should take the "midday slump" in pupils' performance levels into account, Adequate facilities for relaxation and rest should be provided. There should also be places where younger pupils could sleep.
- Large schools such as comprehensive should be divided into a number of smaller units.

Fear is one of the most important indicators of stress from the pedagogical and psychological point of view. The experts were particularly worried about the way pupils responded to this fear. They lived with it constantly and had no means of getting it off their chests.

The experts suggested a number of ways of reducing this fear: changing examination conditions, extending the range of optinal subjects, giving the pupil more opportunity to participate in lessons and the choice of topics to be dealt with, and making the lessons more "individualised."

Furthermore large schools should be divided up and made more human and the present marking system should be replaced by a more flexible system of assessment with less emphasis on competition than on the relation between attainment and ability of each pupil. The experts also recommended that teaching methods could be changed.

Finally, parents ought to be kept informed of their children's progress in school. This would prevent children being punished "by withdrawal of affection" if their school results did not reach their parents' expectations.

The practice of setting homework was found to be "highly problematic". The experts criticised schools for setting more than the maximum allowable amount in every age-group. The work was often done in unfavourable conditions and in the early afternoon, a time when pupils are at a physiological low.

Most parents attach great importance to homework. This was often their only opportunity of finding out what work was being done in the school. The experts thought that the way parents checked homework put a strain on the parent-child relationship. There was no proof that homework was an effective means of learning.

The report goes on to say that teachers clearly have not been trained to set useful and sensible homework. "Most homework is purely mechanical rote-learning." The result is that information "learnt" in this way is not retained in the "long-term memory."

The reports are to be published this year. The Education Ministry is planning a seminar this autumn to which scientists, parents, teachers, pupils and doctors are to be invited. The subject under discussion will be stress at school and how it can be reduced.

"Of course we will use these reports when considering any new measures to be introduced. They will play an important part in our planning with the various states," said minister Rohde.

Hans Jörg Sottorf

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 9 July 1977)

■ CINEMA

Wenders' new thriller a clever playing with cinematic myths

How many films have been made with the theme "crime does not pay"? Quite a few. Nonetheless, in Wim Wenders' *Der amerikanische Freund* (The American Friend), based on Patricia Highsmith's thriller *Ripley's Game*, everything is fresh, new and exciting again.

The reason for this is that Wenders, while sticking fairly close to the gangster film genre, gives his characters a powerful, restless, motivating inner life that can be summed up in one phrase: a melancholy revolt against a world without adventure.

The quiet everyday life of framemaker Jonathan Zimmermann is disturbed by a man who is looking for a killer. Jonathan is suffering from leukemia and probably has only a short while to live. The man wants him to kill two mafiosi. Jonathan takes on the "job", because it is well paid and he wants to leave something to his wife and child.

But he is reckoning without the American Ripley. Ripley started the whole thing on his boss' instructions, but then he suddenly starts working on his own bat. He interferes with the smooth, execution of the crime. Things turn out badly and the ending is much more violent than planned.

Ripley is the American friend. In his cowboy hat he marches through Hamburg like an exiled western hero, deals in faked paintings, lives in a huge villa, seems to be in search of something he cannot define.

Ripley is played by Dennis Hopper, whose pentup energy reminds us of Kirk Douglas of old. His personality ensures that the film never becomes the mechanical unfolding of a series of events. But the same also applies to Bruno Ganz, brooding amidst his own world of frames, and Gérard Blain, the mysterious boss.

Behind their hard exteriors they are sensitive, vulnerable men, damaged by their experience of reality. Behind their determined faces we sense unfulfilled dreams, and in Jonathan's case we can see how these dreams can turn a man into a murderer.

The mafiosi, on the other hand, are evil, cold. Ironically, Wenders chose film directors to play these terrifying inhuman figures. They are simply there, we never find out where they came from or where they are going (unless to their deaths). Samuel Fuller is particularly convincing in his role.

Daniel Schmid and Peter Lilienthal also play mafiosi, and Nicholas Ray — famous from *The Bridge on the River Kwai*, plays an old painter whom the public imagines to be dead.

By this casting-trick, Wenders introduces film-history as quotation into his film. Samuel Fuller appeared in Jean-Luc Godard's *Pierrot le Fou* in 1965 — a brilliant film about a man who turns criminal because he has lost his grasp of reality. In Godard's film Fuller said what he thought about the cinema, but in Wenders' film he hardly says anything.

Even so, he and his colleagues are always threateningly present, walking reminders that film is something "made" and therefore something artificial. We find similar references when Gerard Blain stands next to a film projector, when we see flickering television pictures and moving images from the days before films existed.

The story in Wenders' previous film, *Kings of the Road*, was taken from life, whereas *Der amerikanische Freund* is pure fiction, pure construction — a clever playing with cinema myths such as the honourable gangster, friendship between men, huge threatening murderous cities. (Hamburg, Paris and Munich are all archetypal towns, you can hardly tell one from the other.)

Everything is done with astonishing perfection. The use of colour is precise, the camerawork extraordinarily skilful, even the night scenes. (Cameraman Robby Müller). Wenders is carrying on the tradition of Hitchcock and Jean-Pierre Melville. If the film has a fault, it is that everything is perhaps too perfect and too beautiful in view of the horror of the final reckoning.

Der amerikanische Freund proves that Wim Wenders, born 1945 in Düsseldorf, is the most wideranging of the young German directors, the man most likely to be able to compete successfully with Hollywood's fictions — as his handling of the international cast in this film shows.

But he does not forget people in the process — as Lisa Kreuzer's part in the film shows. She is Jonathan's appalled wife, knowing nothing of what is going on but finally caught up in it. She is the lonely woman left behind while the men are putting their friendship to the test.

Rainer Hartmann

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 4 July 1977)

Bruno Ganz and Lisa Kreuzer as Jonathan and Marianne in Wim Wenders film *Der amerikanische Freund* (Photo: Filmverlag der Autoren)

Three films by women at Berlin festival

Not all films made by women are about women. Three of the films entered for the Berlin film festival competition this year are by women: Joan Micklin Silver, an American, Heidi Genee, a German, and Larissa Schepitko, a Russian. The number of films by women in the Young Forum is considerably higher — seven out of thirty-two.

Of the three films entered for the competition, only one, that by Heidi Genee, has women as its subject. The film, *Grete Minde*, (based on a novel by Theodore Fontane) was relatively expensive to produce (2.7 million marks) and is correspondingly lengthy.

The star of the film is nineteen-year-old Katerina Jacob, a daughter of Ellen Schwiers. It is the story of a young girl in 17th century Germany.

Her mother is Spanish and the community in which she lives never quite accept her as one of theirs. She breaks out of rigid convention, has a lover by whom she has a child and becomes an outsider.

Her own brother refuses to help her and withholds half of the inheritance to which she is entitled. In revenge she sets the town on fire and herself dies in the flames.

The two other films are more interesting. Joan Micklin Silver's film, *Between the Fronts*, looks at what has become of a group of young people who published an anti-Vietnam war paper in Boston, the heady days of student unrest, the civil rights movement and anti-war demonstrations.

Ten years later they are still doing the same thing. But they have lost impetus, protest has become routine and suddenly they get an offer from a big newspaper concern that wants to buy them up.

We are all too familiar with the world Joan Micklin Silver shows us. There is the journalist who is always talking about a book he will probably never write.

The moral posturings of the one-time revolutionaries are mercilessly exposed, but this is done with wit and humour. The viewer is never given a chance to condemn these not quite so young rebels.

The third film, *The Ascent*, by Larissa Schepitko, is quite remarkable. The action takes place in a desolate Russian landscape of snow and ice. At first it seems to be a tough film about partisan warfare in the second world war, but then it gradually builds up into an almost religious allegory of good and evil.

Probably for the first time in Russian film history we find Russian fellow-travellers who have gone over to the Germans. Two exhausted partisans fall into their hands. One turns traitor, the other holds out till the end, till death.

The film thus turns out to be an epic. Although the film is in black and white, no one can accuse the director of painting things in black and white.

Michael Stone

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 5 July 1977)

■ MEDICINE

Doctors trying to determine how viruses can trigger cancer

The 10th West Berlin conference of cancer specialists attempted to take stock of our knowledge concerning the causes and the growth of malignant tumours.

The conference, which was attended by 40 specialists from seven countries, revealed how little we actually know about the processes involved in cancerous growths.

There is no solution concerning the enigma "cancer" in the offing as yet, notwithstanding the fact that researchers throughout the world have for many years been engaged in an all-out effort to track down the causes of malignant tumours.

The biochemical, biomolecular and genetic links are becoming more complex rather than more simple. It is therefore unlikely that we shall have clarity for some time to come.

All Berlin discussions made it clear that cancer neither presents uniform symptoms nor can the many forms of cancer be attributed to the same causes.

It has, however, been known since the beginning of this century that, apart from chemicals, viruses and certain rays can trigger the growth of malignant tumours. This assumption has been repeatedly confirmed by animal experiments and cell cultures. It can therefore no longer be doubted that viruses play a major role in cancer.

The genetic information of viruses, in other words the viral DNS, is wholly or partially implanted in the host cell's DNS and superimposed on the cell's genetic information.

But not all cells the structure of which has thus been changed acquire the qualities of tumours cells. In many cells we can therefore distinguish the tracks of viruses although no actual degeneration has set in.

Moreover, most cells show so-called "endogenous viruses" which are probably hereditary and passed from generation to generation.

The doctors who met in Berlin stressed that both malignant and benign tumours in human beings can have a virus history. But what role viruses actually play still remains the great mystery of cancer.

The theory that the integration of a small segment of the virus DNS into the cell DNS is unimportant does not seem very likely. On the other hand, it is assumed that viruses are directly responsible for mutations in the cells and that this triggers the malignant growth at a later date.

There are weighty reasons that speak in favour of both these theories although neither of them can be substantiated.

It is, however, probable that cancer is not triggered by viruses alone. Based on their biochemical, biomolecular and genetic knowledge, researchers today assume that viruses are activated in a manner still unknown to us.

The biomolecular processes in the cell, which in the final analysis are at the root of cancer, are still a mystery. Thus for instance cells seem to be prone to interference in the genes substance only at a certain stage of maturity.

On the other hand, it is known today that cells have at times undergone changes long before a malignant growth manifests itself.

This means that cancer cells can be dormant for years, erupting into life at some later stage and multiplying at a tremendous rate. This explains why in some people growth begins relatively shortly after the infection whereas in others there is a latent period extending over decades.

At the press conference given in connection with the Berlin meeting, Professor Werner Doerfler, Cologne, pointed out that so far we have only one sure example of viruses causing a tumour in Man. In this case the tumour is the benign wart.

Warts are caused by the so-called papilloma viruses. The Epstein-Barr (EBV) which causes a malignant lymphoma in African children (the so-called Burkitt lymphoma) and certain herpes viruses are suspected of playing a role in cancer. But this has not yet been established as a definite fact.

Some of the participants in the Berlin conference in fact maintained that the part played by viruses in bringing on cancer has been greatly overestimated in the past few years. But none of the researchers present in Berlin were able to put forward a more plausible theory — if one disregards chemicals as a triggering mechanism in cancer.

To all intents and purposes there are malignant cells even in a healthy organism. The point at which these cells can become dangerous depends on the latency period and on the body's reaction to attacks by degenerated cells.

The body's own defence system can, in some mysterious way, recognise degeneration. The "traitors" in this case are the so-called anti-genes — protein substances which are released by the misguided functions of degenerate cells.

These anti-genes are located on the cell's surface, and as soon as they are recognised as alien matter the immunological system of the body should theoretically destroy them.

But these processes, too, are still unknown. Like the effect of other defence systems and of hormones on the growth of tumours, these processes also call for closer examination.

One of the most important problems in modern cancer research is the question whether cancer is governed by genetic aspects.

It has lately been observed with increasing frequency that certain tumours are more prevalent in some families than in others. As a result, it is suspected that they are hereditary. But this is still unproved, and there is no evidence of a link between cancer and genetic factors.

Professor Karl Illmensee of the Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor, Maine, USA, explained how future research can clarify this aspect. The answer to this question is not only of interest to medicine, but to the general public. Professor Illmensee, an American of German descent, has for some years been experimenting with so-called teratoma cells. These are malignant cells obtained primarily from ovary and testicle tumours of mammals, primarily mice. In cultures, these cells develop along the lines of malignant tumours tissue. But when implanted into the embryos of mice they lose their malignant character. Implantation must, however, take place at a very early stage of development. The fertilised ovum must not yet be in the uterus. Given these precautions, the teratoma cell develops like any other cell in the embryo. It undergoes all processes of growth and differentiation. In other words, the originally malignant cell must therefore have turned into a normal cell again. By means of a special biological technique Professor Illmensee wants to examine whether other tumour cells also lose their malignant qualities if implanted in embryos.



Aid for the deaf

This "wristwatch" is one of the aids for the deaf pioneered at Munich University, Federal Republic of Germany. It taps out a mechanical message on the skin, enabling a mother to call in her deaf child for lunch, say. The idea is simple yet invaluable. A more sophisticated experiment aims at transmitting electrical impulses to a deaf person's skin — in patterns resembling Braille. But these trials are still in their early stages. It remains to be seen how sensitive the skin and nerves are, but this too is an intriguing idea. (Photos: Universität München)

The objective of these complicated tests is to clarify the link between genetic factors and cancer in Man. The answer to these questions will certainly take more than a couple of years. Provided all goes according to plan, the first partial results are likely to be available in about five years.

In his efforts to clarify these links, Professor Illmensee must avail himself of a meanwhile well-tried and successful trick.

Initially, cells of mice must be combined with human cells in a test tube. These hybrid cells contain the total of genetic information of both mouse and Man.

But in the course of cell division, the human chromosomes are lost while those of the mouse are preserved. The trick in this experiment is to stop the growth of the culture at the very moment when there is only a single human chromosome in the hybrid cell.

To start with, it is left to chance which chromosome remains. But researchers have already found ways and means of controlling the selection.

The aim of these tests is to implant this hybrid cell with a human chromosome into a mouse embryo and see what happens to the mouse *progeny*.

Professor Illmensee does not want to use random human chromosomes, but primarily those in which a link with cancer is suspected. He believes that this will one day enable him to establish whether chromosomes have qualities which can trigger cancer and in which part of the body cancer will occur.

The idea is fascinating, and there can be no doubt that it would take cancer research a great step forward.

According to Professor Illmensee, he intends to carry out tests with cells of retinoblastomas, an eye tumour. This tumour is particularly prevalent in certain families, as has been established by studies. It is also known that genetic information is carried by the chromosome 13 which might be responsible as a triggering mechanism for this malignant growth.

Professor Illmensee also pointed out that certain techniques enable researchers to demonstrate in which sector of the chromosome the cancer triggering quality is localised. This also provides the basis for gen surgery.

By means of a biochemical technique it should then be possible to cut out that sector of the chromosome which is responsible for malignant tumours.

But all this is speculation for the future, and Professor Illmensee did not want to delve into it further. He said that as a researcher he is primarily interested in the scientific links. How his insights will be used in the future is of secondary importance to him.

Moreover, it will still take a long time before the speculative goal has been reached and it would be wrong to raise false hopes. *Konrad Müller-Christiansen*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 July 1977)

A longer life with blood group 0

People with blood group 0 are the most frequent patients in doctors' surgeries.

The Heidelberg psychiatrist Dr K. Diebold established that they account for the most neurotics. Men with the blood group 0 complain more than others about stomach disorders, some of them of a nervous nature and some organic.


But despite their frequent illnesses, those with the blood group 0 have a relatively high life expectancy. This has been established by a study carried out by Göttingen University.

Men and women with the blood group A feel ill less frequently, but they tend to have higher blood pressure and die earlier.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 9 July 1977)

■ OUR WORLD

Plan for postmen to be 'social helpers' too



The proposal put forward by the German Postal Workers' Union (DPG) that the Federal Republic of Germany's 64,630 postmen be used as "social workers" along Swedish lines has caused a stir at Bonn's Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

A work group is at present examining all aspects of the proposal and is expected to submit a final report by September.

The Postal Authority is enchanted with the idea because it could achieve an excellent PR effect by displaying its "social awareness".

As a member of the work group put it, it would be nice to have a slogan like "The Postman — Your Friend and Helper".

But not all quarters have been equally pleased by the new proposal. Thus for instance the Federal Association of Nurses for the Aged protested against interference in the work of its members.

Wilhelm Weltermann, a high-ranking official at the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, tried to allay the Association's apprehensions, saying: "We don't want to interfere in their jobs by taking on nursing tasks. In any event, our people are not trained for that kind of work."

The postmen are only intended to relieve old and helpless people of such tasks as dealing with officialdom, going to the pharmacy to pick up medicine and taking care of minor shopping.

Hans Jürgen Beck of the Postal Workers' Union in Frankfurt had this to say: "The way we see it, the Social Welfare Department would provide a list of people to be visited by postmen at specific intervals. All this can be done without additional bureaucracy."

Herr Beck considers postmen as the ideal people to take on the role of "Angels in Blue" (a reference to the blue uniform of Germany's postmen).

He said: "Who else has constant contact with old people, if not the postman? Even the loneliest of people receive mail at least once every few days — be it only printed matter. Our people could well take on the additional job of looking after the sick and seeing if there is anything they need or perhaps exchanging a few encouraging words with the lonely."

The whole idea stems from Hermann Schönfelder, the social affairs adviser of the Main-Kinzig administrative district in Hanau.

Towards the end of last year already he approached the postmaster of Hanau, suggesting that an experiment to that effect be made. The postmaster asked his superior authority for permission, which immediately led to legal reservations.

The question that arose was, who would be liable if a postman were to make a mistake in the course of his unofficial service or if he were to meet with an accident? That settled the matter for the time being.

But now the Postal Workers' Union has seized upon the suggestion. As one of its officials put it: "Our postmen are enthusiastic about the idea."

They are probably not wrong at all in feeling that there are likely to be some tips in it. The union, on the other hand, is more concerned with securing jobs.

The Postal Authority has reduced the number of costly postmen by some 1,000 to 64,630 since 1973. Moreover, all postal forecasts operate on the assumption that the volume of mail will diminish as the number of telephone subscribers increases. And fewer letters means fewer postmen.

The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs were convinced that new communications systems such as office teletypes, telecopying machines and two-way closed circuit TV with which the shop around the corner can be contacted would reduce the volume of mail still further.

Until 1975 it seemed as if developments confirmed these forecasts. After years of diminishing, the number of letters unexpectedly rose last year, rising from 10,400 million to 11,100 million.

Says Herr Weltermann: "We have meanwhile amended our forecasts. Telephone conversations are evidently confirmed by letter more often than we assumed. Moreover, additional means of communications seem to give rise to additional demand. The letter is with us to stay, and we assume that the volume of mail will continue to rise gradually."

This means that there will be no redundancies among our postmen. They have plenty of work doing their normal rounds. If they were to engage in social work it would be necessary to hire more postmen. These people could come from sectors with redundancies due to automation in the sorting of mail. The Bonn work group has figured out that some 10,000 additional postmen will be needed if every postman were to devote only one hour a day to social work. Estimated cost for the additional staff should amount to roughly DM500 million per annum. This obviously raises the question: Who is to foot the bill? The Postal Authority already has an annual deficit of DM560 million in its mail sector. At the moment, the idea is that the additional cost is to be borne by those who are financially well off and that the Social Welfare Department will jump into the breach for the others. Meanwhile, however, the public has suggested to the Postal Authority in Bonn that it improve its postal service before branching out into other services. But there are also others who feel differently. Says a handicapped citizen of Bielefeld: "I cannot walk properly, and would be a great help if a postman were to take my letters and parcels to the Post Office for mailing."

Herr Weltermann gave assurances that this will be taken into account when considering the matter further.

There is, however, one bugbear: It would be very difficult to charge a fee for what are in fact postal services. The postman cannot charge 60 pfennigs for a 50-pfennig stamp just because it is made available to a person at home.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 9 July 1977)


Lonely hearts' P.O.B

One of the most unusual postal addresses in the world is this nearly thousand year old oak tree near Eutin in Schleswig-Holstein. As soon as the postman has delivered mail addressed to "Astloch" (Tree hole) young single people scramble up the ladder to see if maybe there's a letter for them. Usually about a dozen letters a day are delivered. (Photo: Conti-Press)

No name, wrong address, but the mail still gets delivered

Every year the Post Office finds itself stuck with close to one million letters, postcards and parcels which cannot be delivered due to missing, wrong or fictitious addresses. These problems are particularly prevalent in the vacation season.

For close to a year now, 46 "detectives" have been at work at the Central Investigation Office in Marburg, trying



to establish senders and recipients of vacation photographs, films of weddings, tapes, transparencies and other important mail.

This service costs DM50 million per annum, says the Postal Authority. The Central Investigation Office began its work in February 1976.

It is housed in a former office for radio licence fees. When the collection of these fees was computerised redundancies were created in this region. The postal officials who became redundant are now tracking down undeliverable mail from their desks.

The most common cause of their detective work, says the head of the Office, Richard Kaletsch, is forgetfulness. Some 900,000 love and other letters, 22,000 registered letters, 19,000 parcels, 11,000 films and transparencies and 5,000 tapes frequently have neither sender nor recipient.

Especially films and transparencies are frequently not put in the proper mailing envelopes provided for them.

According to Herr Kaletsch, the success quota amounts to between 70 and 80 per cent. Every third vacation film reaches its destination somehow — though, of course, late.

Richard Kaletsch points out, however, that the information provided by hobby photographers enquiring about the fate of their material is frequently inadequate.

He therefore asks that the pictures be described exactly and not just by indications such as "beach photo". It would be useful, he says, if some information were given about the objects in the photograph, and where wedding pictures are concerned it would be good to have the design of the wallpaper in the background, the number of candles on the table and a description of the clothing worn.

In the case of undeliverable pornographic objects and films it is equally important to know every detail.

In his experience, Herr Kaletsch says, companies dealing in such material frequently put fictitious senders' names on the envelope. Their customers often want the stuff mailed poste restante since they do not want anyone to know where their real interests lie.

There are frequently valuables to be found in mail that is initially undeliverable. In the case of an engagement ring which a disgruntled girl sent back to her fiancé, considerable detective work was required. The fiancé — as Herr Kaletsch suspected — smelled a rat and refused to accept the letter.

Two weeks later the Post Office was able to deliver the letter.

A letter from the Soviet Union, written in Cyrillic script, required the help of an ethnic German from the Soviet Union employed by the Post Office: only when that didn't help, university professors had to be pressed into service.

The outcome was that the letter which, according to the postal code, should have gone to Bavaria, was actually meant to go to Hungary.

Items which cannot be delivered after six months of private-eye work are put up for auction in Marburg once a month. Perishable goods are sorted out beforehand.


The proceeds of the auctions, Herr Kaletsch pointed out, provide up to DM2,000 which goes into a fund for needy postal workers.

The range of objects extends from penny items to unexposed film and from cakes to unsettled tax assessments.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 July 1977)

■ SPORT

Soccer star Günter Netzer quits to set up as a match promoter



Günter Netzer of Borussia Mönchengladbach Real Madrid and Grasshoppers Zürich has finally retired from professional soccer at the age of thirty-two.

Netzer, one of soccer's all-time greats, chose to retire without making a song and dance about it and preferred to forgo the blaze of glory. Neither would have been in keeping with his usually level-headed character.

He has chosen to retire in Switzerland, which has been his home for this final season, and he intends to stay there.

But has he really retired? Well, not quite. "If Grasshoppers are up against it in the Uefa Cup or a friendly" he might consider lending a hand.

After twelve seasons in major-league soccer Netzer is obviously not intent on retiring to the life of an old-age pensioner from one day to the next.

There is, moreover, another reason why he is not abandoning the game that has been his livelihood once and for all. Günter Netzer has applied to the Swiss cantonal authorities for a visa extension with the intention of setting up as a match promoter.

He feels Zürich is the ideal location from which to operate and reckons he should be able to capitalise on the countless contacts he has made over the years.

"Let there be no misunderstandings," he noted in an interview with *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*, "I intend to arrange fixtures. I shall not be arranging transfers. Too much shady business goes on in that side of football in my opinion."

So Netzer will continue to be associated with association football, watching from the sidelines as soccer increasingly becomes a matter of power play and speed and there is less and less room for personalities of his calibre.

Günter Netzer failed to make the 1974 World Cup-winning team. In the entire tournament he played one single half, coming on to replace Wolfgang Overath of Cologne in Hamburg in the match against the GDR.

This, soccer fans in the Federal Republic of Germany will certainly remember, was the fixture in which Jürgen Sparwasser of Magdeburg scored the only goal to beat the team captained by Franz Beckenbauer which went on to defeat Holland in the Munich World Cup final.

Victory for the GDR in Hamburg left soccer fans in East Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden cock-a-hoop, while their counterparts in this country were sorely grieved to see the home side lose this encounter between the two German States.

That was in 1974, by which time Günter Netzer was no longer quite at the top of the tree. Soccer was no longer the game for individualists of his calibre.

The modern game involved blood, sweat, toil and tears — and above all teamwork. Walter Lutz, the Swiss soccer commentator, is probably right in saying that Günter Netzer was born a decade too late for his style of football.

In 1972 individual stars were still in demand and Günter Netzer played alongside others in a team that many pundits feel was the best international side this country ever fielded.

That year the team won the European championship title in Stockholm, and largely because each and every member of the team, including Franz Beckenbauer, unquestioningly accepted the inspired leadership of Günter Netzer, an exceptional captain who intuitively sensed when the time was right for a crucial move.

A tactician like Netzer is not the sort of player to change into soccer's equivalent of a long-distance runner. When the long-distance runners began to monopolise the game and the schemers were no longer in demand, Netzer was no longer allowed a free rein.

His star began to wane with Real Madrid and he has certainly no longer been the player he once was during his final season with Grasshoppers Zürich.

At the end of a great career which included two national club championship titles as captain of Borussia Mönchengladbach Günter Netzer can afford to look back without rancour at the ups and downs of which he, like everyone else, has had his fair share.

Prior to the 1970 World Cup tournament in Mexico he was on anything but the best of terms with national coach Helmut Schön. He then sustained a lengthy injury which definitely put paid to his prospects of selection for the Mexico squad.

He then clashed with Mönchengladbach coach Hennes Weisweiler, who at one stage no longer wanted to select him for away fixtures because Netzer had no ambitions (and was doubtless not cut out) to play the part of a long-distance runner.

Günther Netzer has always considered soccer to represent a challenge. He has always preferred to go about the game in his own inimitable way.

Günter Netzer (Photo: Sven Simon)

Many soccer fans and fellow-players and officials respect and admire Netzer as a player. But he has few close friends. Too many people have rated him a spoilt prima donna.

His future career in football will doubtless combine the rough and the smooth too, but at least Günter Netzer has invested his money wisely. He owns two apartment blocks, for instance, so at least the rent from eighteen apartments will keep him from the breadline.

Soccer fans will be reading less about Günter Netzer on the sports pages of their newspapers from now on, but it is reasonable to assume that they will not forget him entirely in a hurry.

Jupp Müller

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 10 July 1977)

Ninth tennis title for Helga Masthoff

Essen players won both the singles titles at the sixty-fourth national tennis championships in West Berlin. In the women's singles 35-year-old Helga Masthoff beat 33-year-old Ameli Ring from Dachau, near Munich, in two straight sets.

Frau Masthoff clinched her ninth title (and fourteenth appearance in the finals) 6-2, 6-1, while the men's final was contested by two Essen players.

Peter Elter, just nineteen years old, beat Andreas Maurer 6-2, 1-6, 6-3, 7-5. He is the youngest men's singles champion ever — in 64 years of championships.

Andreas Maurer also deserves a pat on the back. It was his first championship final too, and in the quarter-finals he eliminated the title defender Max Wünschig from Amberg.

Helga Masthoff started the ball rolling, as it were. She had little difficulty in defeating Ameli Ring, a Dachau solicitor who reached her first championship final with an unorthodox style of play and, indeed, the controversial Bavarian racket.

The Bavarian "wonder racket" is strung on both sides and it certainly stood Ameli Ring in good stead, since she reached the finals without even being seeded.

"It proved an advantage that I had played against her before," Helga Masthoff noted after what was another successful title defence, "but this kind of tennis is no fun at all."



Helga Masthoff in action (Photo: dpa)

Ameli Ring, née Hacks, was junior champion in 1961 and 1962. She held her own until 2-2 in the first set, then Helga Masthoff's succession of lobs and volleys made short shrift of her. Frau Masthoff went on to serve aces and generally prove more than a match for her Bavarian opponent, which came as a suprise inasmuch as in the previous day's semi-finals Iris Riedel of Berlin had even taken her to match point on one occasion. Ameli Ring nonetheless put paid to Katja Ebbinghaus, now of Hamburg, 3-6, 6-4, 6-4, in her semi-final. In the men's finals Peter Elter clinched matters fairly convincingly by virtue of greater pressure and flexibility. "We know each other's game too well," he said of his clubmate and opponent after the final, "although it was certainly a good game."

Despite losing, Andreas Maurer was far from dismayed. "En route to the final I at least eliminated Erwin Müller from Vilsbiburg with his rubber racket."

The new men's doubles champions are Klaus Eberhard and Reinhardt Probst of Hanover and Amberg respectively, who beast Hartmut Kirchhübel and Harald Neuner of Hanover 6-3, 6-3, 6-2.

The mixed doubles were won by Heidi Eisterlehner and Uli Marten of Reutling and Amberg respectively.

Helga Masthoff won her second title in the women's doubles alongside Katja Ebbinghaus. They beat Silvia Hanika and Ameli Ring of Munich and Dachau 3-6, 6-0, 6-0.

In all fairness it must be added that the losers had just played an exhausting semi-final against Kerstin Seelbach and Birgit Wegemann of Offenbach and Hagen.

They won their semi-final narrowly 7-6, 2-6, 7-5. On aggregate, indeed, they would have lost sixteen games to seventeen. At all events they had to play the final almost immediately afterwards. *sid*

(Bremer Nachrichten, 11 July 1977)